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Predicting the reliability of software systems based on a component-based approach is
inherently difficult, in particular due to failure dependencies between software compo-
nents. One possible way to assess and include dependency aspects in software reliability
models is to find upper bounds for probabilities that software components fail simulta-
neously and then include these into the reliability models. In earlier research, it has been
shown that including partial dependency information may give substantial improvements
in predicting the reliability of compound software compared to assuming independence
between all software components. Furthermore, it has been shown that including de-
pendencies between pairs of data-parallel components may give predictions close to the
system’s true reliability. In this paper, a Bayesian hypothesis testing approach for find-
ing upper bounds for probabilities that pairs of software components fail simultaneously
is described. This approach consists of two main steps: 1) establishing prior probability
distributions for probabilities that pairs of software components fail simultaneously and
2) updating these prior probability distributions by performing statistical testing. In this
paper, the focus is on the first step in the Bayesian hypothesis testing approach, and two
possible procedures for establishing a prior probability distribution for the probability
that a pair of software components fails simultaneously are proposed.
Keywords: Compound software; component dependencies; Bayesian hypothesis testing;
expert judgment; prior information.
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1. Introduction
The problem of assessing reliability of software has been a research topic for more
than 30 years, and several successful methods for predicting the reliability of an
individual software component based on testing have been presented in Frankl et
al. 13, Goel 14, Hamlet 19, Lyu 40, Miller et al. 42, Musa 44, Ramamoorthy and Bas-
tani 51, and Voas and Miller 59. However, there are still no methods fully successful
for predicting reliability of compound software a based on reliability data on the
system’s individual software components 15,17,60.
1.1. Motivation
For hardware, even in critical systems, it is accepted to base the reliability as-
sessment on failure statistics, i.e. to measure the failure probability of individual
hardware components and then compute system reliability on this basis. This is
applied for example in safety instrumented systems in petroleum 22. However, the
characteristics of software make it difficult to carry out such a reliability assess-
ment. Software is not subject to aging and any failure that occurs during operation
is due to faults that are inherent in the software from the beginning. Any random-
ness in software failure is due to randomness in input data. It is also a fact that
environments such as hardware, operating system and user needs change over time
and that software reliability may change over time due to these activities 9.
Furthermore, having a system consisting of several software components b ex-
plicitly requires an assessment of the software components’ failure dependencies c.
This is discussed more thoroughly in, among others, Cortellessa and Grassi 7, Dai
et al. 10, Gokhale and Trivedi 16, Guo et al. 18, Littlewood et al. 38, Lyu 40, Nicola
and Goyal 46, Popic et al. 49, Popov et al. 50, and Tomek et al. 56. In addition to
the fact that software reliability assessment is inherently difficult due to software
complexity and that software is sensitive to changes in usage, failure dependencies
between software components represent a substantial problem.
Although several different approaches to construct component-based software
reliability models have been proposed in, among others, Cortellessa and Grassi 7,
Gokhale and Trivedi 15, Gokhale 16, Goseva-Popstojanova and Trivedi 17, Ham-
let 20,21, Krishnamurthy and Mathur 25, Krka et al. 32, Kuball et al. 33, Popic et
al. 49, Reussner et al. 52, Singh et al. 54, Trung and Thang 57, Vieira and Richard-
son 58, and Yacoub et al. 61, most of these approaches tend to ignore failure de-
pendencies between software components 11,24,36. In principle, the failure proba-
bility of a single software component can be assessed through statistical testing
12,53. However, since critical software components usually have low failure proba-
bilities 38, in practice the number of tests required to obtain adequate confidence
aSoftware systems consisting of multiple software components.
bSee Definition 1 in Subsection 1.2.
cSee Definition 2 in Subsection 1.2.
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in such probabilities becomes very large. An even more non-trivial situation arises
when probabilities for simultaneous failures d of several software components need
to be assessed, since they are likely to be significantly smaller than single failure
probabilities.
Based on the fact that software components rarely fail independently and that
statistical testing (for assessing the probability for software components failing si-
multaneously) is practically impossible, the main focus of our research has been to
develop a practicable component-based approach for assessing reliability of com-
pound software in which failure dependencies between software components are
explicitly addressed 27,28,29,30,31.
One possible way to assess and include dependency aspects in software reliabil-
ity models is to find upper bounds for probabilities that software components fail
simultaneously and then include these into the reliability models. In Kristiansen et
al. 29 it is shown that including partial dependency information may give substan-
tial improvements in the reliability predictions of compound software compared to
assuming independence between all software components. Furthermore, it is shown
that including dependencies between pairs of data-parallel components e may give
predictions close to the true system reliability. It is also shown that dependencies
between pairs of data-parallel components are far more important than dependen-
cies between pairs of data-serial components f .
In this paper, the theory on how to apply Bayesian hypothesis testing 8,26,55
to find upper bounds for probabilities that pairs of software components fail si-
multaneously is described in detail. This approach can be divided into two main
steps. In the first step, prior probability distributions for probabilities that pairs of
software components fail simultaneously are established. In the second step, these
distributions are updated by performing statistical testing. In this paper, two pos-
sible procedures for establishing a prior probability distribution for the probability
that a pair of software components fails simultaneously are proposed.
1.2. Definitions
In this paper, the following definitions are used:
Definition 1. Software component: a software component (or module or unit)
is considered to be an entity that has a predefined and specified boundary and which
is atomic in the sense that it can not or will not be divided into sub-components. No
special assumptions are made whether the component is available in binary format
or as source code. The context is essentially an Off-The-Shelf (OTS) situation where
custom-developed and PDS components g are combined to achieve a larger piece of
software.
dSee Definition 3 in Subsection 1.2.
eSee Definition 4 in Subsection 1.2.
fSee Definition 5 in Subsection 1.2.
gSee Definition 6 in Subsection 1.2..
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Definition 2. Failure dependency between software components: compo-
nents are said to fail dependently if the knowledge that one software component
has failed changes our belief whether or not another software component fails 60. It
is necessary to make a clear distinctions between the degree of dependency between
software components (expressed through e.g. simultaneous failure probabilities) and
the mechanisms that either cause or exclude software components to fail depen-
dently (interface complexity, shared resources, programming language, development
team, etc.)
Definition 3. Simultaneous failure: the event that more than one software
component fails on the same system input. Component failures are not required
to occur at the same instant, it is adequate that they are all in a failed state at
some point in time.
Definition 4. Data-parallel components: two components i and j are said to
be data-parallel components if neither i nor j receives data (d), directly or indirectly
through other components, from the other 29.
i
d9 j and j d9 i (1)
Definition 5. Data-serial components: two components i and j are said to
be data-serial components if either i or j receives data (d), directly or indirectly
through other components, from the other 29.
i
d→ j or j d→ i (2)
Definition 6. Pre-developed software (PDS): software which already exists,
is available as commercial or proprietary product and is being considered for use
in a computer-based system 1. This definition encompasses any kind of reuse of
software whether it is black-box, commercially available, from an in-house library,
or just happens to be available from another system.
1.3. Assumptions
In this paper, only on-demand types of situations are considered, i.e. situations
where the system is given an input and execution is considered to be finished when
a corresponding output has been produced. The following assumptions are made:
• The states of the software components are positively correlated.
• All data-flow relations between the software components are known.
• The reliabilities of the individual software components are known.
• The system and its components have only two possible states (functioning
and failed).
• The system has a monotone structure 45.
March 18, 2011 16:25 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ijrqse˙2011˙uio˙report
A Bayesian hypothesis testing approach 5
The research has been inspired by the following basic problem. Assume a compound
software, e.g. a fault tolerant system capable of switching between two redundant
software components in case of failure. Furthermore, assume that the failure prob-
abilities of the individual software components are available. Even in this ideal
situation, it is difficult to compute the failure probability of the complete system
since no information regarding the failure dependencies between the software com-
ponents is available. In this paper, the main focus is to include dependency aspects
in software reliability models by applying Bayesian hypothesis testing.
1.4. Notation
In this paper, capital letters are used to denote random variables and lower-case
letters are used for their realizations.
To indicate the state of the ith component, a binary value xi is assigned to
component i 2.
xi =
{
0 if component i is in the failed state
1 if component i is in the functioning state
(3)
Important notation used throughout this paper is listed in Table 1.
1.5. The structure of this paper
Section 2 summarizes some related work regarding the issue of failure depen-
dency between software components. In Section 3, relevant background information
needed to understand the Bayesian hypothesis testing approach and our overall ap-
proach for assessing reliability of compound software are described 27. In Section 4,
a Bayesian hypothesis testing approach for finding upper bounds for probabilities
that pairs of software components fail simultaneously is illustrated. This approach
consists of two main steps: 1) establishing prior probability distributions for proba-
bilities that pairs of software components fail simultaneously and 2) updating these
prior probability distributions by performing statistical testing. In Section 5, two
possible procedures for establishing a prior probability distribution for the proba-
bility that a pair of of software components fails simultaneously are proposed. In
addition, relevant information sources which may influence this probability distri-
bution are presented. Section 6 summarizes the results, discusses the assumptions
made and presents ideas for further work.
2. Related work
Most research and discussions on software component dependency over the years
are mainly related to software design diversity, especially to N -version program-
ming where output is decided by a voter using the results from N components as
input. The idea behind N -version programming is that by forcing various aspects
March 18, 2011 16:25 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ijrqse˙2011˙uio˙report
6 Kristiansen, Winther and Natvig
Table 1. Notation.
Term Explanation
n = number of tests
r = number of failures in n tests
θ = an unknown quantity, for example the probability
that a pair of software components fails simultaneously
qij = the probability that a pair (i, j) of software components
fails simultaneously
q0,ij = an accepted upper bound for qi,j
pi(θ) = a prior probability distribution for θ
pi(qij) = a prior probability distribution for qij defined in the
sub-intervals [aij , q0,ij ] and [q0,ij , bij ]
g(qij) = a prior probability distribution for qij defined in the
interval [aij , bij ]
D = sample information
pi(θ|D) = a posterior probability distribution for θ
pi(qij |D) = a posterior probability distribution for qij
[aij , bij ] = interval where the simultaneous failure probability qij is defined
H0 = null hypothesis (aij ≤ qij ≤ q0,ij)
H1 = alternative hypothesis (q0,ij < qij ≤ bij)
B = Bayes factor
L(θ|D) = likelihood function
pi0 = prior belief in the null hypothesis
(P (H0) = P (aij ≤ qij ≤ q0,ij))
pi1 = prior belief in the alternative hypothesis
(P (H1) = P (q0,ij < qij ≤ bij))
α0 = posterior belief in the null hypothesis (P (H0|D))
α1 = posterior belief in the alternative hypothesis (P (H1|D))
C0,ij = a given predefined confidence level for the simultaneous
failure probability of a pair (i, j) of software components
(P (H0|D) ≥ C0,ij)
g0(qij) = a probability distribution describing how the prior mass
is spread out over the null hypothesis
g1(qij) = a probability distribution describing how the prior mass
is spread out over the alternative hypothesis
α, β = parameters in the beta distribution
of the development process to be different, i.e. development team, methods, tools,
programming languages, etc., the likelihood of having the same fault in several
components would become negligible.
The hypothesis that independently developed components fail independently
has been investigated from various perspectives. A direct test of this hypothesis
was done in Knight and Leveson 24 where a total of 27 components were developed
by different people. Although the results can be debated, this experiment indicated
that assuming independence should be done with caution. The experiment showed
that the number of tests for which several components failed was much higher than
anticipated under the assumption of independence. While there are many different
mechanisms that might cause even independently developed components to fail on
the same inputs, it does not seem implausible that the simple fact that programmers
are likely to approach a problem in much the same way causes them to make the
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same mistakes and thus generates dependency between the components’ failure
behavior.
A more theoretical approach on the same issue was presented in Eckhardt and
Lee 11 and elaborated on a few years later in Littlewood and Miller 36. A more
comprehensive discussion is provided in Littlewood et al. 38.
In the Eckhardt and Lee model (EL-model) there are two basic sources of un-
certainty: 1) the random selection of input from the space of all inputs and 2) the
random creation of a component version from the population of all possible com-
ponent versions that can be written. The key variable in the model is the difficulty
function φ(x) defined to be the probability that a component version chosen at
random fails on a particular input demand x. In other words, if many component
versions are selected independently, the difficulty function is the proportion of these
that fail on a particular input. The idea of the Eckhardt and Lee model is that the
difficulty function generally takes different values for different inputs, representing
the varying difficulty in correctly processing different inputs. The more difficult an
input x is, the greater is the chance that an unknown component version fails.
The main result in the EL-model is that independently developed component
versions do not imply independent component versions. The key point is that as
long as some inputs are more difficult to process than others, even independently de-
veloped component versions fail dependently. In fact, the more the difficulty varies
between the inputs, the greater is the dependence in failure behavior between com-
ponent versions. Only in the special situation where all inputs are equally difficult,
i.e. the difficulty function φ(x) is constant for all x ∈ Ω, independently developed
component versions fail independently.
The Littlewood and Miller model (LM-model) is a generalization of the EL-
model in which different component versions are developed using diverse method-
ologies. In this context, the different development methodologies might represent
different development environments, different types of programmers, different lan-
guages, different testing regimes, etc. Thus, a component version has a different
probability of being developed under methodology A than under methodology B.
If the methodologies are very diverse, one expects a component version with a high
probability of being developed under one methodology to have a low probability of
being developed under another.
The main result of the LM-model is that the use of diverse methodologies de-
creases the probability of simultaneous failure of several component versions. In
fact, they show that it is theoretically possible to obtain component versions which
exhibit better than independent failure behavior. So while it is natural to try to
justify an assumption of independence, it is worthwhile noticing that having inde-
pendent component versions is not necessarily the optimal situation with regard to
maximizing reliability.
The main problem with both the EL-model and the LM-model is that the predic-
tions of these models are predictions for an “average” multi-version development.
These models consider all possible software realizations from the same specifica-
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tion and say nothing about a particular pair of component versions. Thus, actual
realizations may be different from these averages.
In Popov et al. 50, the authors extend the previous conceptual models proposed
in Eckhardt and Lee 11 and Littlewood and Miller 36 and address the problem of
assessing the reliability of a specific set of component versions. All their models
refer to the simplest possible diverse-redundant configuration, i.e. two component
versions (A and B) with perfect adjudication (1-out-of-2 system). This means that
the system behaves correctly provided that either A or B behaves correctly. In
Popov et al. 50, the upper bounds are based on knowledge on the input space of the
component versions. For each sub-domain Si (i = 1, . . . , n), the authors assume that
the probability P (Si) of drawing a random input from Si is known. Furthermore,
they assume that the failure probabilities of component versions A and B for inputs
from each sub-domain Si ( PA|Si and PB|Si) are known.
If it is assumed that component versions fail independently within each sub-
domain, the probability of simultaneous failure between component versions on
a random input can be calculated directly from the known probabilities, i.e.
PA,Bsub−ind =
∑
i PA|SiPB|SiP (Si). This estimate is an intermediate value be-
tween the true failure probability (PA,B) and the failure probability one gets when
assuming independence between the two component versions, i.e. PAPB . In fact,
assuming conditional independence of failures within sub-domains is therefore less
optimistic than assuming unconditional independence of the whole input space.
In Littlewood et al. 37, the problem of assessing reliability of a 1-out-of-2 sys-
tem is also considered. To do this, the authors apply Bayesian inference which
includes establishing a prior belief regarding the parameters of interest and then
updating these by using Bayes theorem when “hard” evidence becomes available.
assuming that A and B are two diverse components, calculation of the system
reliability requires that the probabilities PA = P (A fails), PB = P (B fails) and
PAB = P (Both A and B fails) are determined. This means that the degree of de-
pendence between software components is implicitly addressed through PAB .
In the most general case, the authors’ propose that a 3-dimensional prior must
be determined for the three probabilities which is conceptually and practicably
very hard. In the less difficult situation where both PA and PB are assumed to be
known, the authors run into a paradox where the posterior probability of system
failure becomes higher than the prior probability when no component failures are
observed during testing. The reason for this paradox is that the probability of
having no failure in any of the components, i.e. 1− PA − PB + PAB is large if the
probability PAB is also large. Hence, in practice it seems that neither the ”full”
approach where all the relevant probabilities are handled simultaneously, nor the
simplified approach where two out of three probabilities are assumed to be known
work.
While the work of Littlewood et al. 37 focuses on all three failure probabilities
PA, PB and PAB , we solely focus on PAB and suggest a Bayesian hypothesis testing
approach to find upper bounds for probabilities that pairs of software components
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fail simultaneously. This approach uses all relevant information which is available
prior to testing and consists of the following main steps:
1. Establishing prior probability distributions for probabilities that pairs of
software components fail simultaneously based on all relevant information
available prior to testing (Section 5).
2. Updating these prior probability distributions by performing statistical
testing (Section 4).
3. Theoretical background
In this section, relevant background information on statistical testing and Bayesian
analysis is described in detail. In addition, it is shown how failure probabilities
of individual components and the assumption of positive correlation put direct
restrictions on the components’ simultaneous failure probabilities. All this informa-
tion is needed to understand the Bayesian hypothesis testing approach for finding
upper bounds for probabilities that pairs of software components fail simultane-
ously. At last, our approach for assessing the reliability of compound software is
described in detail 27. In this approach, failure dependencies between pairs of soft-
ware components are explicitly addressed by applying Bayesian hypothesis testing
on simultaneous failure probabilities.
3.1. Statistical testing
Statistical testing 12,53 consists of exposing a piece of software to test cases drawn
randomly according to some probability distribution defined over the program’s
input space. Such testing can be used to assess a software component’s failure
probability. Typical assumptions in statistical testing are: i) independent test runs,
ii) constant failure rate, iii) all failures during testing are detected and iv) the
operational profile is known.
One benefit of statistical testing is that it requires no knowledge of the internal
structure of the software components being tested. This is of great importance
when PDS components h are used, for which one might not have all the required
information available.
Let p0 denote the accepted upper failure probability. The number of fault free
tests n which must be carried out to satisfy the failure probability p0 at a given
confidence level C0 using classical statistical testing is given in Equation 4
48.
n =
ln(1− C0)
ln(1− p0) (4)
hSee Definition 6 in Section 1.2.
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3.2. Bayesian analysis
Bayesian analysis 3 consists of combining prior information pi(θ) and sample infor-
mation D into a posterior distribution pi(θ|D) for θ given D. It is from this posterior
distribution all decisions and inferences are made in Bayesian analysis. Bayes the-
orem 3 is expressed in Equation 5 where the prior distribution pi(θ) reflects beliefs
about θ prior to testing and the posterior distribution pi(θ|D) reflects updated be-
liefs about θ after testing. L(θ|D) is the likelihood function which expresses the
likelihood of θ given sample information D.
pi(θ|D) = L(θ|D)pi(θ)∫
Θ
L(θ|D)pi(θ)dθ (5)
In hypothesis testing, a null hypothesis (H0) and an alternative hypothesis (H1)
are specified. In classical statistics, one decides between H0 and H1 by examining
type I and type II error probabilities. These probabilities of error represent the
chance that for an observed sample the test procedure results in the wrong hy-
pothesis being accepted. Type I error occurs when H0 is rejected when it is true
and type II error occurs when H0 is accepted when it is false. In Bayesian anal-
ysis, hypothesis testing is conceptually more straightforward. One calculates the
posterior probabilities α0 = P (H0|D) and α1 = P (H1|D) which combine both test
data and prior knowledge and then decide between H0 and H1 accordingly
3. Often
it is convenient to summaries the evidence in term of posterior odds. Saying that
α0/α1 > R clearly says that H0 is R times as likely to be true as H1. Although
the posterior probabilities of the hypotheses are the primary measures in Bayesian
hypothesis testing, the prior probabilities pi0 = P (H0) and pi1 = P (H1) are also of
interest. The ratio pi0/pi1 is called the prior odds ratio and the Bayes factor can be
expressed by combining the prior and posterior odds ratios (see Equation 6).
B =
α0/α1
pi0/pi1
=
α0pi1
α1pi0
(6)
The Bayes factor is the odds ratio for H0 to H1 that is given by the data
3. If
the Bayes factor is greater than one, data helped increasing odds in favor of the
null hypothesis 8. The Bayes factor forms the basis for finding the number of tests
required to satisfy a predefined upper bound q0,ij at confidence level C0,ij in the
proposed approach for finding upper bounds for probabilities that pairs of software
components fail simultaneously. This approach is elaborated in detail in Section 4.
3.3. Prior Information from the Software Components’ failure
probabilities
In this section, it is illustrated how the software components’ marginal failure proba-
bilities put direct restrictions on the components’ simultaneous failure probabilities.
Let qi and qj denote the failure probability of components i and j, respectively, and
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let qij denote the simultaneous failure probability of components i and j. If it can
be assumed that the components’ failure probabilities do not change due to changes
in operational context, the following is true:
qij ≤ min(qi, qj), (7)
which follows directly from the fact that:
qij = P (Xi = 0 ∩Xj = 0) = P (Xi = 0)P (Xj = 0|Xi = 0)
= P (Xj = 0)P (Xi = 0|Xj = 0). (8)
In general, one would expect positive correlation between components i and j since
some inputs are more difficult (more error-prone) than others 38. Even if diverse
components are produced “independently”, failures are more likely to happen on
certain inputs than others. This means that if component i fails, the failure proba-
bility of component j will also increase. However, when components are in parallel
this may not always be a reasonable assumption. If components have been devel-
oped by different development teams and by using different development methods
and languages, it might in fact be natural to assume negative correlation. This
means that if one component fails, the failure probability of the other component
decreases and visa versa. However, assuming positive correlation is far more con-
servative than assuming independence between software components when it comes
to predicting system’s reliability. It follows that:
qij ≥ qiqj . (9)
Reasonable constraints on the simultaneous failure probability qij under the given
assumptions can therefore be expressed as follows:
qiqj ≤ qij ≤ min(qi, qj). (10)
From Equation 10, it can be clearly seen that information on the software compo-
nents’ marginal failure probabilities can be used directly to specify the upper and
lower limit for the simultaneous failure probability qij . In the following, these limits
will be used to:
• specify the hypotheses in the component-based approach (Subsection 3.4
and Section 4).
• specify a starting point when establishing a prior probability distribution
for the simultaneous failure probability qij (Section 5).
The topic on how the reliabilities of individual software components put direct
restrictions on the components’ conditional reliabilities is elaborated in more de-
tail in Kristiansen et al. 29. In this paper, the authors present restrictions on the
conditional reliabilities in general systems consisting of two and three components.
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Fig. 1. Possible values for the conditional reliabilities in a two components system when a)
p1 = 0.999 and p2 = 0.999, b) p1 = 0.999 and p2 = 0.9999 and c) p1 = 0.9999 and p2 = 0.999.
Examples of how the marginal reliabilities p1 and p2 influence the conditional relia-
bilities p2|1 and p2|1¯ in a general two components system are illustrated in Figure 1.
The graphs clearly show that the restrictions on the conditional reliabilities de-
pend heavily on the values of the marginal reliabilities. In fact, in some cases the
conditional reliabilities are restricted into narrow intervals.
In the same way, it is shown how the marginal reliabilities p1, p2, and p3 influence
the conditional reliabilities p2|1, p2|1¯, p3|1, p3|1¯, p3|2, p3|2¯, p3|12 and p3|1¯2¯ in a general
three components system. An example is illustrated in Table 2 which should be read
Table 2. Restrictions on the conditional reliabilities p2|1,
p3|1, p3|2 and p3|12 in a simple three components system
when p1 = 0.9999, p2 = 0.999 and p3 = 0.99.
Example 1
First assumption:
p1 = 0.9999
p2 = 0.999
p3 = 0.99
Results in:
p2|1 ∈ [0.999, 0.9990999] p2|1¯ ∈ [0, 0.999]
p3|1 ∈ [0.99, 0.990099] p3|1¯ ∈ [0, 0.99]
p3|2 ∈ [0.99, 0.99099099] p3|2¯ ∈ [0, 0.99]
p3|12 ∈ [0.99, 0.99099999] p3|1¯2¯ ∈ [0, 0.99]
Second assumption:
p2|1 = 0.99905
p3|1 = 0.990085
Results in:
p3|2 ∈ [0.990043, 0.990964] p3|2¯ ∈ [0.026468, 0.947503]
p3|12 ∈ [0.990085, 0.990999] p3|1¯2¯ ∈ [0, 0.140085]
Third assumption:
p3|2 = 0.9903
Results in:
p3|12 ∈ [0.990336, 0.990342] p3|1¯2¯ ∈ [0, 0.140085]
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as follows:
• In the first assumption it is assumed that the marginal reliabilities of the
components are known. Knowing these reliabilities puts direct restrictions
on all the remaining conditional reliabilities. In some cases they limit the
conditional reliabilities into small intervals.
• In the second assumption it is assumed that the conditional reliabilities
p2|1 and p3|1 are known in addition to the marginal reliabilities. This puts
even more strict restrictions on the remaining conditional reliabilities p3|2,
p3|2¯, p3|12 and p3|1¯2¯.
• In the third assumption the conditional reliability p3|2 is also assumed to be
known and it can be easily seen that the more information that is available,
the more strict are the restrictions on the remaining reliabilities p3|12 and
p3|1¯2¯.
3.4. A component-based approach for assessing the reliability of
compound software
The main focus of our research has been to develop a component-based approach
for assessing reliability of compound software where failure dependencies between
software components are addressed explicitly 27. One possible way to assess and
include dependency aspects in software reliability models is to find upper bounds for
probabilities that pairs of software components fail simultaneously and then include
these into the reliability models. To find these upper bounds, the suggested approach
applies Bayesian hypothesis testing 8,26,55 on simultaneous failure probabilities (see
Section 4 for details). It is assumed that failure probabilities of individual software
components are known. The approach is illustrated in Figure 2 and consists of five
basic steps.
1. Identify the most important component failure dependencies: based on the
structure of the software components in the compound software and infor-
mation regarding individual software components, identify those dependen-
cies between pairs of software components which are of greatest importance
for the calculation of the system reliability 29. Repeat steps 2-4 for all rel-
evant component dependencies in the system.
2. Define the hypotheses: let q0,ij represent an accepted upper bound for the
probability (qij) that a pair (i, j) of software components fail simultane-
ously. The upper bound q0,ij is assumed to be context specific and prede-
fined and is typically derived from standards, regulation authorities, cus-
tomers, etc. Define the following hypotheses:
H0 : aij ≤ qij ≤ q0,ij
H1 : q0,ij < qij ≤ bij
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Fig. 2. A component-based approach for assessing the reliability of compound software.
where qij is defined in the interval [aij , bij ]. The interval limits aij and bij
represent the lower and upper limit for qij , respectively and are decided by
the restrictions that the components’ marginal failure probabilities put on
the components’ simultaneous failure probabilities (Subsection 3.3).
3. Describe prior belief regarding probability qij : establish a prior probability
distribution pi(qij) for the probability that a pair of software components
fail simultaneously. Based on this probability distribution the prior belief
in the null hypothesis (P (H0)) must be quantified.
4. Update your belief in hypothesis H0: based on the prior belief in the null
hypothesis P (H0) from step 3 and a predefined confidence level C0,ij , the
number of tests required to obtain an adequate upper bound for the proba-
bility of simultaneous failure can be found for different numbers of failures
r encountered during testing. The more failures that occur during testing,
the more tests are required to reach C0,ij . For further details on when to
stop testing see Section 4 or Cukic et al. 8.
5. Calculate the complete system’s failure probability : information regarding
individual software components’ failure probabilities (which are assumed
to be known) and upper bounds for the most important simultaneous fail-
ure probabilities (found in step 1-4) can finally be combined to obtain an
upper bound for the failure probability of the entire system. This can be
performed by various methods, e.g. by discrete event simulation when di-
rect calculation becomes too complicated.
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Step 1 in the component-based approach has been discussed in Kristiansen et al. 29.
In that paper, a test system consisting of five components is investigated to iden-
tify possible rules for selecting the most important component dependencies. To
do this, three different techniques are applied: 1) direct calculation, 2) Birnbaum’s
importance measure of a component and 3) Principal Component Analysis (PCA).
The results from the analyses clearly show that including partial dependency infor-
mation may give substantial improvements in the reliability predictions compared
to assuming independence between all software components. However, this is only
true as long as the most important component dependencies are included in the
reliability calculations. It is also apparent that dependencies between pairs of data-
parallel components are far more important than dependencies between pairs of
data-serial components. Furthermore, the analyses indicate that including only de-
pendencies between pairs of data-parallel components may give predictions close
to the system’s true failure probability as long as the dependency between the
most unreliable components is included. Including only dependencies between pairs
of data-serial components may however result in predictions even worse than by
assuming independence between all software components.
Step 3 in the component-based approach has been discussed in Kristiansen et
al. 31. In that paper, the results from an experimental study which investigates the
relations between a set of internal software metrics (McCabe’s cyclomatic complex-
ity, Halstead metrics, Source Lines of Code etc.) and stochastic failure dependency
between software components are presented. The experiment was performed by an-
alyzing a large collection of program versions submitted to the same specification in
a programming competition on the Internet: the Online judge i. In the study, pairs
of program versions were investigated. To measure the probability that a pair of
program versions fails dependently, the study used the simultaneous failure proba-
bility of the program versions. If any relations between the probabilities that pairs
of software components fail simultaneously and their difference in software metrics
can be identified, one possible step forward will be to use this information as prior
information in the Bayesian hypothesis testing approach for finding upper bounds
for simultaneous failures between pairs of software components. Results from uni-
variate analyses show that if the difference between metric values of two program
versions is small, it is impossible to decide the degree of failure dependency be-
tween those two program versions. However, given that the metric values for a pair
of program versions differ significantly and the program versions are reasonable
mature, results indicate that the probability for simultaneous failures is less than
the probability calculated if the metric values were similar.
In addition, a simulator which explicitly accounts for failure dependencies be-
tween the software components and can be used to calculate the complete system’s
failure probability when direct calculation becomes too difficult has been devel-
ihttp://icpcres.ecs.baylor.edu/onlinejudge
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oped. This simulator can be used in step 5 in the component-based approach and
is described in Kristiansen et al. 30.
The rest of the present paper focuses on steps 3 and 4 in the component-based
approach and describes a Bayesian hypothesis testing approach for finding upper
bounds for probabilities that pairs of software components fail simultaneously. First,
the theory behind this approach is described in detail in Section 4. Then two pro-
cedures for establishing a prior probability distribution for the probability that a
pair of software components fails simultaneously are described in Section 5.
4. Bayesian hypothesis testing applied on simultaneous failure
probabilities of pairs of software components
One possible approach to find upper bounds for probabilities that pairs of software
components fail simultaneously is to use Bayesian hypothesis testing 8,26,27,55.
Assume that H0 and H1 are defined as in step 2 in Section 3.4 where qij is a
probability in the interval [aij , bij ]. Here qij represents the probability that a pair
(i, j) of software components fails simultaneously. The interval limits aij and bij
represent the lower and upper limit for qij , respectively, and are decided by the
restrictions the components’ marginal failure probabilities put on the components’
simultaneous failure probabilities as described in Section 3.3 (for more information
see Kristiansen et al. 29). In this case, the null and alternative hypotheses state that
the probability for a pair of software components to fail simultaneously is lower and
higher than the given upper bound q0,ij , respectively.
Notice that the hypotheses are defined the opposite way of classical statistical
hypothesis testing. In classical hypothesis testing, the alternative hypothesis usually
expresses what one wishes to confirm, i.e. that the probability for simultaneous
failure is less than a predefined upper bound q0,ij , whereas the null hypothesis is
the most conservative and expresses the opposite. In this way, the doubt benefits
the null hypothesis which is true until the opposite is proved. However, by looking
at the mathematics in the Bayesian hypothesis testing approach it can be easily
seen that it does not matter which way the hypotheses are defined.
To express the prior belief in the simultaneous failure probability qij , two sep-
arate probability distributions over the intervals [aij , q0,ij ] and (q0,ij , bij ] can be
used 3. This is expressed in Equation 11.
pi(qij) =
{
P (H0)g0(qij) aij ≤ qij ≤ q0,ij
P (H1)g1(qij) q0,ij < qij ≤ bij (11)
where g0(qij) and g1(qij) are proper probability density functions (g0(qij) > 0,∫ q0,ij
aij
g0(qij)dqij = 1, g1(qij) > 0,
∫ bij
q0,ij
g1(qij)dqij = 1) which describe how the
prior mass is spread out over the two hypotheses.
Let g(qij) be the prior probability distribution for qij in the interval [aij , bij ].
The probability density functions g0(qij) and g1(qij) can then be defined as shown
in Equations 12 and 13.
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g0(qij) =
1
P (H0)
g(qij) aij ≤ qij ≤ q0,ij (12)
g1(qij) =
1
P (H1)
g(qij) q0,ij < qij ≤ bij (13)
The probability distribution for observing r simultaneous failures during testing
given n independent trials and a constant simultaneous failure probability qij can
be expressed by the binomial probability distribution. This is shown in Equation 14.
f(r|qij , n) =
(
n
r
)
qrij(1− qij)n−r (14)
The posterior belief in the null hypothesis H0 is the probability of the null hypoth-
esis in light of data and prior knowledge. For acceptance, this probability must be
higher than a given predefined confidence level C0,ij .
P (H0|r, n) ≥ C0,ij (15)
The number of tests n required to satisfy the confidence level C0,ij for different
numbers of simultaneous failures encountered r during testing can be found by
using Bayes factor. Based on Equations 11 and 14, the posterior odds ratio can be
expressed as shown in Equation 16.
α0
α1
=
P (H0|r, n)
P (H1|r, n) =
∫ q0,ij
aij
f(r|qij , n)P (H0)g0(qij)dqij∫ bij
q0,ij
f(r|qij , n)P (H1)g1(qij)dqij
(16)
Further, it can easily be shown that the Bayes factor given by Equation 6 can be
written as the weighted likelihood ratio as shown in Equation 17.
B =
∫ q0,ij
aij
f(r|qij , n)g0(qij)dqij∫ bij
q0,ij
f(r|qij , n)g1(qij)dqij
(17)
Based on the acceptance criterion in Equation 15, it can be shown that the Bayes
factor given in Equation 6 must satisfy Equation 18 8.
B ≥ C0,ijP (H1)
(1− C0,ij)P (H0) (18)
The number of tests n required to obtain an adequate upper bound for the proba-
bility that a pair of software components fails simultaneously for different numbers
of simultaneous failures r encountered during testing can be found by solving Equa-
tion 19, which is based on Equations 17 and 18.
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∫ q0,ij
aij
f(r|qij , n)g0(qij)dqij∫ bij
q0,ij
f(r|qij , n)g1(qij)dqij
=
C0,ijP (H1)
(1− C0,ij)P (H0) (19)
Equation 19 can be solved numerically by simply programming a loop which stops
and returns the number of tests when the left side exceeds the right side in the
equation. The integrals must be solved by using numerical integration.
5. Establishing prior probability distributions for probabilities
that pairs of software components fail simultaneously
Before testing can be performed in the Bayesian hypothesis testing approach de-
scribed in Section 4, a prior probability distribution g(qij) for the simultaneous
failure probability qij defined in the interval [aij , bij ] must be established. This dis-
tribution is needed for establishing g0(qij) and g1(qij) in Equations 12 and 13 and
for calculating P (H0) and P (H1).
The main motivation for establishing a prior probability distribution for qij
is to utilize all relevant information sources available prior to testing in order to
compensate for the enormous number of tests which is usually required to satisfy
a predefined confidence level C0,ij . In the case where reasonable prior information
is available, the number of tests which must be run to achieve C0,ij in Equation 15
can be greatly reduced.
In the following, two procedures for establishing a prior probability distribution
g(qij) for the simultaneous failure probability qij are proposed. Both procedures
consist of two main steps, the first step being common for both of them.
1. Establish a starting point for qij based on a transformed beta distribution.
2. Adjust this starting point up or down by applying expert judgment on
relevant information sources available prior to testing.
In the first procedure, the prior probability distribution for qij is determined by
letting experts adjust the initial mean and variance of qij in the transformed beta
distribution based on relevant information sources. In the second procedure, the
prior transformed beta distribution for qij is adjusted numerically by letting experts
express their belief in the total number of tests and the number of simultaneous
failures that all relevant information sources correspond to. A combination of these
two procedures can also be applied, since it might be easier for experts to adjust
the mean and variance for some information sources, whereas for other information
sources it might be easier to express belief about the total number of tests and the
number of simultaneous failures.
The challenge of using expert judgment for decision making and how to calibrate
experts has been addressed in several books and papers, among others Clemen and
Lichtendahl 4, Cooke 5, Cooke and Goossens 6, Lin and Bier 35, Meyer and Booker 41
and Mosleh et al. 43. There is also a lot of research covering the psychological
biases encountered by using expert judgment, among others Kahneman et al. 23
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and Plous 47.
In the following subsection, ideas on how to establish a starting point for the si-
multaneous failure probability qij are described. Then, two procedures for adjusting
this starting point up or down based on relevant information sources and expert
judgment are described in detail. Finally, a set of available information sources
relevant for adjusting the starting point for qij is presented.
5.1. Establishing a starting point
As a basis for establishing a starting point for the simultaneous failure probability
qij , the following two assumptions are made:
1. The individual software components’ failure probabilities are available.
2. The components are positively correlated.
Additionally, if it can be assumed that the failure probabilities of the individual
components do not change due to changes in the operational context, reasonable
constraints on the simultaneous failure probability qij can be found as shown in
Equation 10 in Section 3.3. Let aij = qiqj and bij = min(qi, qj) denote the lower
and upper limit for the simultaneous failure probability qij , respectively. Under the
assumption that the failure probabilities of the individual components do not change
due to changes in the operational context, one possible way to identify the initial
values of the mean and variance of qij is to assume that qij is uniformally distributed
(beta distributed with parameters α = β = 1 over the interval [aij , bij ]). The initial
mean (µI) and variance (σ
2
I ) are then given by the following two equations:
µI =
aij + bij
2
(20)
σ2I =
(bij − aij)2
12
(21)
However, since changes in the operational context are likely to change the failure
probability of the individual components, a more conservative starting point is to
use bij = min(qi, qj) as the initial mean. A possible set of initial values of the mean
and variance of qij can therefore be given by: µI = bij and σ
2
I = (bij − aij)2/12.
It is important to notice that these initial values are only a starting point for
describing the simultaneous failure probability qij . These values and accordingly
the resulting transformed beta distribution describing qij are adjusted by applying
expert judgment on relevant information sources available prior to testing.
When the initial values of the mean and variance of qij in the transformed
beta distribution are known, the initial values of the parameters αI and βI in the
standard beta distribution can be found directly by applying linear transformation.
This is shown in Equations 22 and 23.
µI = aij + (bij − aij) αI
αI + βI
(22)
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σ2I = (bij − aij)2
αIβI
(αI + βI)2(αI + βI + 1)
(23)
Another possible way to identify initial values of α and β in the standard beta
distribution is to visualize a “fictive” experiment in which nI is the total number
of experiments and αI is the number of simultaneous failures of components i
and j. The simultaneous failure probability qij can then be assumed to have a
transformed beta distribution with parameters αI and βI = nI − αI defined in the
interval [aij , bij ].
In addition to the the individual software components’ failure probabilities, in-
formation regarding components’ architecture, complexity, programming languages,
development processes, etc. might as well be available. This information is also rel-
evant for assessing qij and can be used to adjust its starting point up or down by
applying expert judgment. In the following two subsections, two procedures for ad-
justing the starting point for qij up or down based on relevant information sources
and expert judgment are described.
5.2. Establishing a prior probability distribution for qij by
adjusting its mean and variance
In the following section, a procedure on how relevant information sources can be
used to adjust the initial mean µI and variance σ
2
I of the simultaneous failure
probability qij in the transformed beta distribution is described. To illustrate this
procedure, only two information sources are considered.
Define the following two information sources:
I1 : Degree of complexity of the interface between the components.
I2 : Degree of similarity between the programming languages of components
i and j.
Assume that both information sources can be assigned values in the interval [0, 1],
such that a value close to 0 indicates low complexity (substantial difference in pro-
gramming language) and a value close to 1 indicates extreme complexity (identical
programming languages). In addition, let a value of 0.5 describe the “typical” sit-
uation for the components under consideration.
Based on these two information sources, the following interpretations seem plau-
sible:
1. I1 and I2 are both close to 0: the mean and variance of the prior distribution
are lower than µI and σI
2, respectively.
2. I1 and I2 are both close to 1: the mean of the prior distribution is larger
than µI , while the variance is smaller than σI
2.
3. I1 is close to 0 and I2 is close to 1: the mean is dependent on the relative
importance of I1 and I2, while the variance is larger than σI
2.
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4. I1 is close to 0.5 and I2 is close to 0: the mean of the prior distribution is
lower than µI , and the variance is close to σI
2.
In order to establish a prior probability distribution for qij , a functional relationship
between the initial values defined by µI , σI
2, all relevant information sources and
the parameters α and β in the standard beta distribution must be defined.
Let Ii ∈ [0, 1] denote information source i where i = 1, . . . , r, and let ki ∈
[0, 1] express the relative importance of each information source. Furthermore, let
µ denote the adjusted mean of qij and σ
2 the adjusted variance in the transformed
beta distribution. A simplistic way to update the mean and variance using the
information sources might then be as follows:
µ =
2µI(k1I1 + k2I2 + · · ·+ krIr)
k1 + k2 + · · ·+ kr (24)
σ2 = σI
2kV ar(I), (25)
where V ar(I) is the sample variance calculated over the information sources Ii, and
k is an impact factor that defines the impact the differences in the Ii values should
have. The updated variance σ2 increases if there are large differences between the
Ii’s (i.e. they give divergent information) and decreases if the differences between
the Ii’s are small (i.e. they give similar information). Note that if Ii = 0.5 for
i = 1, . . . , n, then µ = µI .
In the above procedure, both the Ii’s, ki’s and k must be determined by experts.
Then when the updated values of the mean and variance are found, the parameters
α and β in the standard beta distribution can be found by solving Equations 22
and 23 by replacing αI by α, βI by β, µI by µ and σ
2
I by σ
2.
5.3. Establishing a prior probability distribution for qij by
adjusting it numerically
Based on the starting point established in Section 5.1, let us assume that the simul-
taneous failure probability qij can be expressed by a transformed beta distribution
with parameters αI and βI . In order to adjust this probability distribution, a func-
tional relationship between the initial parameters defined by αI and βI and all
relevant information sources must be defined.
As in Section 5.2, let Ii denote a relevant information source i and let ki express
the relative importance of this information source. Further, let n0 and α0 represent
the total number of tests and the number of simultaneous failures of components i
and j that all relevant information sources correspond to, respectively.
A possible way to find α0 using all relevant information sources is expressed in
Equation 26.
α0 =
n0(k1I1 + · · ·+ krIr)
k1 + · · ·+ kr (26)
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From this equation, it can be easily seen that the larger (closer to 1) the values of
the relevant information sources Ii are, the larger is the number of simultaneous
failures of components i and j.
The information achieved from all relevant information sources correspond to a
binomial probability distribution with parameters α0 and n0. Since the transformed
beta distribution with initial parameters αI and βI defined in the interval [aij , bij ]
lacks the pleasant property of being a natural conjugate prior to the binomial dis-
tribution, the prior probability distribution for the simultaneous failure probability
qij must be adjusted numerically. In the above procedure the Ii’s, ki’s and n0 must
be determined by experts.
5.4. Relevant information sources used to adjust the starting point
In the following section, different types of information sources relevant for adjusting
the starting point for the simultaneous failure probability qij are discussed.
Mechanisms that cause software components to fail simultaneously can be split
into two distinct categories 60:
• Development-cultural aspects (DC-aspects): mechanisms which cause dif-
ferent people, tools, methods, etc. to make the same mistakes.
• Structural aspects (S-aspects): mechanisms which allow a failure in one
component to affect the execution of another component.
The first category can typically be assessed using component specific information
sources Ki. On the other hand, the second category cannot be completely assessed
using only component specific information. Information sources on how the com-
ponents are used in a specific context or in the compound software (Kcompound)
is also needed. While Ki might be viewed as generic information, meaning that it
does not change when the use of the component changes, Kcompound is completely
context-specific.
To successfully adjust the starting point for qij , the following information sources
must be considered by experts 9,34,62:
• The parts of a software component’s pedigree that are relevant to be com-
pared with another software component’s pedigree, i.e. specific elements of
Ki for all components i. This may include:
– Development methodology.
– Programming language.
– Development team.
– Specification.
– Producer’s reputation.
– Software metrics (McCabe’s cyclomatic complexity, Halstead com-
plexity measures, program depth, source lines of code (SLOC), number
of comments and comment lines, number of loops and statements).
– Development tools (e.g. compiler).
– Previous use.
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– Previous testing
– Risk analysis methods.
– Standards.
– Software components’ history.
• The elements comprising Kcompound. This may include:
– Structural isolation of software components.
– Software component’s robustness.
– Sharing of resources (CPU, library routines, data memory, stack, op-
erating system, etc.).
– How the software components are structurally related.
All these underlying information sources can possibly indicate if two software com-
ponents are likely to fail simultaneously or not and can help experts to adjust the
starting point for the simultaneous failure probability (qij) described in Subsec-
tion 5.1.
Both procedures for adjusting the starting point described in Subsections 5.2
and 5.3 assume that relevant information sources can be assigned values in the
interval [0, 1]. A value close to 0 can for example indicate substantial difference
in development methodologies, great diversity between development teams or low
complexity of the interface between the software components. On the other hand,
a value close to 1 can for example indicate use of identical development method-
ologies, extreme complexity of the interface between the software components or
that components are developed by the same development team. The idea is that
the larger (closer to 1) the values of the relevant information sources Ii are, the
larger is the mean µ for the simultaneous failure probability in the first procedure
and the number of simultaneous failures α0 in the second procedure.
A critical question is if experts are able to express their belief about relevant
information sources using a numerical scale from 0 to 1. One possible simplification
is to let experts express their beliefs on an ordinal scale first and then map this onto
a numerical scale. For example, for a five point ordinal scale {very low, low, medium,
high, very high}, “very low” can be associated with the interval [0, 0.2), ”low” can
be associated with the interval [0.2, 0.4) and so on. Furthermore, the mean values
in each interval can be used to perform the calculations in Equations 24 and 26.
6. Summary, discussion and further work
During development of the component-based approach for assessing reliability of
compound software, two major challenges were identified:
1. How to identify those dependencies between pairs of software components
that are of greatest importance for the calculation of the system reliability.
This is necessary since it is not realistic to handle all possible dependencies
in compound software.
2. How to establish prior probability distributions for probabilities that pairs
of software components fail simultaneously.
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Whereas the first challenge has been discussed in detail in Kristiansen et al. 27,29,
the main focus of this paper has been to describe the theory behind the Bayesian
hypothesis testing approach for finding upper bounds for simultaneous failure prob-
abilities (qij). This approach consists of two main steps:
1. Establishing prior probability distributions for probabilities that pairs of
software components fail simultaneously.
2. Updating these prior probability distributions by performing statistical
testing.
In this paper, two possible procedures for establishing a prior probability distribu-
tion g(qij) for the simultaneous failure probability qij have been proposed. In the
first procedure, the prior probability distribution for qij is determined by letting
experts adjust the initial mean and variance of qij in the transformed beta distri-
bution based on relevant information sources. In the second procedure, the prior
transformed beta distribution for qij is adjusted numerically by letting experts
express their belief in the total number of tests and the number of simultaneous
failures that all relevant information sources correspond to.
By covering the second and last challenge in our approach, we finally come
to the definition of a complete component-based approach for assessing reliability
of compound software in which failure dependencies are explicitly addressed. To
include dependency aspects in the reliability model, the approach uses information
on the individual components’ failure probabilities (assumed to be known) and
other relevant information sources available prior to testing. It should, however,
be emphasized that the proposed procedures are only suggestions on how to find
prior probability distributions for probabilities that pairs of software components
fail simultaneously. The validation of these procedures has not yet been performed
and is one of the main tasks for further work. Furthermore, testing the complete
component-based approach on a realistic case will be prioritized.
The component-based approach for assessing reliability of compound software
is based on a set of assumptions (see Subsection 1.3). In the following, a short
discussion regarding these assumptions is given.
Positive correlation between two software components is normally expected es-
sentially because some inputs are more difficult (more error-prone) than others.
Even if two diverse software components are developed “independently”, failures
are more likely to happen on certain inputs than on others. Assuming positive cor-
relation is therefore rather realistic in many cases and far more conservative than
assuming independence between software components when it comes to predicting
the system’s reliability. In addition, recent calculations have shown that assuming
positive correlation has only minor influence on the restrictions that the marginal
component reliabilities put on the conditional reliabilities in a simple two com-
ponents system. However, more research on systems consisting of more than two
components is needed and will be carried out as further work.
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It is natural to assume that some design documents defining the architecture,
component interfaces and other characteristics of the system are available when a
compound software is assessed. Structure charts which graphically show the flow
of data and control information between components in a compound software are
of special interest. They give an overview of the software structure and are funda-
mental for identifying the most important component dependencies in the system,
i.e. those dependencies that influence the system reliability the most.
Although the issue on how to predict reliability of individual software compo-
nents is by no means trivial, our approach assumes that these probabilities are
already known. How to assess these probabilities has been studied by several re-
searchers over the years and an overview of different techniques for predicting the
reliability of a particular software component based on testing can be found in,
among others, Littlewood and Strigini 39, Lyu 40 and Musa 44.
Assuming that the compound software is a monotone system and that the com-
pound software and its components have only two possible states represents a limi-
tation made to simplify our approach. Software components and compound software
do usually have a number of possible failure modes and more research on how to
include multiple failure modes is needed.
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